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NEUROSCIENCE AND PHENOMENOLOGY
This text contributes to a necessary dialogue, and possibly a translation of the different 
notions employed by neuroscience and phenomenology. This effort is particularly 
significant for cognitive neuroscientists whose main topic is social cognition and the 
related notion of intersubjectivity. What I qualify as “embodied simulation” (which 
exploits, not only but mainly, the intrinsic functional organization of the motor system) is 
a crucial functional mechanism in social cognition, not confined to the domain of action, 
but encompassing other aspects of intersubjectivity such as emotion and sensation. 
It is “embodied” because it uses a pre-existing body model in the brain: all the brain 
areas showing mirror mechanisms model our interaction with the world. This model of 
interaction, this praktognosia, turns out to be highly relevant not only when the task is to 
guide our own behavior, but also to understand the behavior of others. The very last part 
of the text is devoted to reply to some arguments against embodied simulation coming 
from phenomenologists themselves.
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I’d like to start by thanking Roberta De Monticelli and the Center of Research 
in Phenomenology and Sciences of the person of Università Vita-Salute San 
Raffaele – Milan for giving me the opportunity to be here and take part to 
this very interesting – and innovative, for Italy – enterprise. We all believe 
that this is just the beginning of a future series of meetings where people 
from different disciplines but nevertheless sharing the same questions will 
have the opportunity, like we are doing during these three days, to meet and 
discuss. 
I’ll start with few opening remarks to make it clear where I am positioned 
with respect to this specific topic: the relationship between Phenomenology 
and Neuroscience. As already kindly quoted by Roberta De Monticelli, few 
years ago I wrote this statement: “we should phenomenologize Cognitive 
Neuroscience rather than naturalizing phenomenology” (Gallese 2006, 
p. 294). Both enterprises at first sight might look a bit spurious at least 
to the phenomenological tradition, which during the early phases of its 
development was very critical towards an approach meant to psychologize 
the content of our phenomenal world. I must say that I am a bit sceptical 
too about the possibility to naturalize Phenomenology, especially if one 
aims to do that by translating Phenomenology in the quantitative language 
of Mathematics, which is one of the possible ways of accomplishing such 
naturalization, fully endorsed by some of the people who were at the origin of 
the now famous book “Naturalizing Phenomenology” (Petitot et al. 1999).
Why should we try to phenomenologize Neuroscience? Because if one of the 
aims of Cognitive Neuroscience is to shed light on the human condition, we 
certainly cannot but start from how the world is constituted within our own 
phenomenal appreciation. 
Further, I strongly believe that a dialogue, an exchange of views, possibly 
an attempt to translate the different notions employed by both disciplines, 
Neuroscience and Phenomenology, should not only be hoped for, but it is 
necessary. Certainly it is necessary for the cognitive neuroscientists whose 
main topic of investigation is the notion of intersubjectivity. And I think that 
the research agenda of Cognitive Neuroscience in the near future should 
certainly encompass the first-person aspect of human experience, but also 
the personal characteristic of the individual subject of that experience. We 
shouldn’t forget that much of what we know about brain function, when we 
are dealing with “garden variety” participants, most volunteers will come 
from a not better specified cohort of Psychology students – this is the truth. 
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Thus, I think we could do a lot more than that by trying to correlate the brain 
function with the personal life history of the individuals we are employing 
in the vest of volunteer to enquire, to understand more about the relation 
between behaviour, between the life of the mind and the contribution of the 
brain-body system. 
What has to be done is to much better specify who are the volunteers 
we are convincing to enter the fMRI. We must correlate how the specific 
being-in-the-world of the individual can be translated into a specific way of 
functioning of her/his brain-body system.
The larger field I would like to enter now is that of the project of naturalizing 
social cognition and we learned from Michele Di Francesco how we should 
envisage such enterprise, what do we mean by naturalizing. 
Let’s start from the mainstream view: according to the mainstream classic 
cognitive view, action and intention understanding, which constitute a very 
important part of our intersubjectivity, consist in interpreting and explaining 
in mental terms the behaviours of others. These behaviours, according to 
this perspective, are intentionally opaque, because they consist of biological 
motion. So, the way someone moves or behaves or acts is intrinsically 
intentionally opaque unless I can identify a hidden internal mental state that 
most likely caused that behaviour, and it is through this sort of ascending 
routine starting from behaviour, but aiming to reach the hidden internal 
mental state, that I can possibly, and only in this way, make sense of the 
behaviour of the other. This explanatory process is referred to as “mind 
reading”, that is, the attribution to others of internal mental states mapped 
in the mind of the observer as internal representations. For most people this 
representation is conceived as being implemented in a propositional format. 
Here is a quote from Alvin Goldman’s (Goldman 2008, p. 3): “In other words, 
to mind read is to form a judgement, belief or representation”.
The problem for people like me is to translate this perspective into the 
working of the tiny little things we have in our head – neurons – which 
collectively we name the brain. And here we should acknowledge that we 
know very little of what is going on, in spite of the fact that many colleagues 
of mine believe they really know what’s going on. Because the problem is this: 
we do not have a clear neuroscientific model of how humans can understand 
the intentions and other mental states promoting the behaviour of others: 
what we have is a series of brain imaging studies showing the activation of 
a set of cortical regions, mesial frontal areas, the temporal parietal junction 
etc., during explicit mentalizing tasks. No one to date was able to provide a 
convincing explanation about why those specific areas do activate during 
mentalization, beside – I want to be very outspoken – the tautological 
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statement that mind reading is implemented in those brain areas. What we 
are left with is just a mere correlation which in science is not the ultimate 
goal, it is the beginning of the story, it is not the end. TQZhis is one out of 
many examples which really epitomizes this huge problem we are facing in 
Cognitive Neurosciences. 
These tiny little squares shown on the mesial aspect of the frontal cortex 
portray activation foci activated in healthy volunteers while engaged in 
explicit mentalizing tasks, like for example attributing false beliefs to a 
fictitious character. The systematic activation of these parts of the mesial 
aspect of the frontal cortex let many scholars to make the statement: bingo, 
we found the home in the brain for the theory of mind module since what 
these people are doing is to mind read someone else. This part of the brain is 
systematically activated during explicit mind reading, hence it follows that 
this is where mind reading occurs at the level of the brain.
However, this is not the brain of a healthy individual, but it’s the brain 
of a lady who suffered a bilateral damage to the supposed theory of mind 
module and the problem lies in the fact that this lady, in spite of having 
faced the complete destruction of the supposed theory of mind module, 
is fully competent in making sense of the behaviour of others (Bird et al. 
2004). So that the authors of this paper conclude that their findings urge 
caution against using functional imaging as the sole method of establishing 
cognitive neuroanatomy. There is another problem: we are told that certain 
sectors in the brain are specifically active with a unique series of tasks, 
namely tasks that ask people to explicitly mentalize, mind read, attribute 
propositional attitudes to others. But we are not even sure of the specificity 
of this activation. One crucial area in the domain of the neural correlates of 
mind reading is the temporal parietal junction (TPJ), the carrefour at which 
the temporal and the parietal lobe merge. For many years authors like – I 
quote one for many – Rebecca Saxe, made the claim that this area is solely 
and uniquely active in mind reading tasks. We learn – from the work of other 
colleagues of Saxe, for example, Jason Mitchell who is at Harvard – that this 
is not true, because the very same TPJ which is active when I attribute false 
beliefs to others is also active when I am engaged in an attentional task which 
has nothing to do with explicit mind reading. Even sexual arousal can lead 
to its activation. Well, we can always say that there are highly sophisticated 
persons who can get sexually aroused only through mind reading but – I 
mean – I would rate this as a very weak argument. 
So, beside the reification of mentalistic notions like belief and intention 
into things to be found at specific locations in the brain, the main problem 
with this approach consists in the fact that the mind reading specificity of 
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this activation is at best highly debatable. Then I ask myself and ourselves 
a rhetoric question: do we really believe there are mind reading specific 
neurons in the brain? We know what a neuron is all about: basically is a 
machine producing action potentials. Mentalizing though, whatever it is, is 
a personal level competence and therefore it cannot be fully reduced to the 
subpersonal activity of mind reading specific clusters of neurons wherever 
they might be located. We should remind ourselves that neurons are not 
epistemic agents, insofar as they only “know” about the ions passing through 
their membranes, giving them the property they have, being excitable cells. 
Neurons, and of course a fortiori mirror neurons or brain areas, are necessary 
but not sufficient conditions for mentalizing, because in order to mentalize 
we need an individual. Let me offer you my reductionist definition of what an 
individual can be reduced to: a properly wired brain-body system interacting 
with a specific environment populated by other brain-body systems. A 
further aspect I would like to emphasize is that when we refer to the brain 
we should always bear in mind that the brain is not a sort of magic box, the 
brain is a subpersonal constituent of our body which gets all the possible 
information about the so-called external world through an interface which 
is the body, which is a very peculiar interface which develops to acquire the 
given shape we now have because of the adaptation to a specific environment 
which obeys to specific physical laws etc. So it is a situated brain-body 
system, the one which is the target of the investigation of people like me. 
I endorse a “bottom-up” approach to social cognition and I would like to start 
by quoting the authors of the book which is the main topic of this Winter 
School: “The other is given in its bodily presence as a lived body” as Gallagher 
and Zahavi write, “a body that is actively engaged in the world”. “Empathy 
is defined as a form of intentionality in which one is directed towards the 
other lived experiences […]”. “In empathy we experience the other directly 
as a person, as an intentional being whose bodily gestures and actions are 
expressive of his or her experiences or states of mind” (Gallagher-Zahavi 
2008, p. 183). Great! 
My problem starts now: how do we accomplish this? My point: at the basis of 
the capacity to understand others’ intentional behaviour in such a direct way, 
both from a phylogenetic and an ontogenetic point of view, there is a basic 
functional mechanism which I qualify as embodied simulation which exploits, 
not only but mainly, the intrinsic functional organization of the motor 
system. So the natural evidence of the world stems from our potentialities for 
action: this is a topic that I assume will be much more detailed and developed 
in the following talk given by Corrado Sinigaglia. Here is a quote from Aron 
Gurwitsch, in a paper which appeared in 1941: “The world in which we live 
and act is peopled with items endowed not only with colors, warmth, smells, 
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shapes etc., but also with qualities like attractive, repulsive, agreeable, […], 
fit for some purpose or other, and so forth. In this world there are actions 
done or to be done, and these actions deposit themselves like qualities 
upon the things with which they are connected” (Gurwitsch 1941, p. 328). 
Merleau-Ponty: “my body appears to me as an attitude directed towards a 
certain existing or possible task. And indeed its spatiality is not, like that of 
the external objects or like that of spatial sensations, a spatiality of position”, 
we are not dealing with geometrical space here, “but a spatiality of situation” 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 100). And a few pages later he develops this and 
clarifies what by spatiality of situation one has to mean. The body “provides 
us with a way of access to the world and the object, with” what he denotes, 
refers to, as “a praktognosia, which has to be recognized as original and 
perhaps as primary” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 140). 
And just to give you a flash of how true I take to be such a statement, an 
example comes from the investigation of one of the many parallel cortico-
cortical networks that reciprocally connect distinct fields within the 
posterior parietal cortex and the ventral premotor cortex of the macaque 
monkey brain. We are dealing with one specific field within the premotor 
cortex of the macaque, area F4, which is immediately facing the primary 
motor cortex, so, if you recall the neural properties of the neurons sitting 
there, these are motor neurons and they control the execution of goal-related 
purposeful movements like stretching out the arm to reach something within 
the peripersonal space or turning the head to orient towards or move away 
from something which is approaching the macaque monkey’s body. These 
neurons combine motor properties – they control the reaching of the arm or 
the orienting or avoidance movement of the head – with tactile properties 
on the same region whose movements the same neuron controls, and visual 
properties. But the most interesting feature of these visual properties is 
that the visual receptive field, the part of the visible space observed by 
the monkey that is effective in driving the discharge of the neuron, is not 
only bidimensional, but has also the dimension of depth. A visual stimulus 
is effective in driving this motor neuron only if it is presented within 
the peripersonal space. Peripersonal space is the outcome of the motor 
potentialities our body instantiates. Premotor neurons map objects within 
peripersonal space as potential targets and, if you allow me, we could define 
these objects in heideggerian terms as “zu-handen objects” of goal directed 
motor behaviour. Premotor neurons accomplish such mapping by means of 
simulation because when the neuron that normally controls the reaching of 
my arm is activated by a visual stimulus within my reaching space, within 
the potentiality of reaching of my arm, then, that object activates a motor 
program which nevertheless doesn’t lead to an overt movement on the side 
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of the observer. The observer is merely watching that object approaching 
to a given body part. This motor activation devoid of any actual movement, 
at least in my opinion, can fully qualify as a motor simulation, because it is 
the activation of a motor neuron which nevertheless doesn’t lead to produce 
overt movement. And here there is another quote of a phenomenologist – Jan 
Patocka – who moves one step further with respect to Heidegger, giving to 
the practical knowledge of the world envisaged by Heidegger, the flash and 
bones of the living body, so to speak. Patocka in Body, Community, Language, 
World writes: “Our primary experience of ourselves is an experience of 
primordial dynamism that manifests itself in our awareness of our existence 
as a moving, active being. This dynamism appears as distinctively linked to 
that which orients us in our movements […] in such a way that our energy is 
always focused on something, on what we are doing” (Patocka 1998, p. 40). 
So, if we go back to intersubjectivity, the conclusion we may provisionally 
draw is the following: we should abandon the Cartesian view of the primacy 
of the ego and adopt a perspective emphasizing the fact that the other is 
co-originally given as the self. Both self and other appear to be intertwined 
because of the intercorporeity linking them. Intercorporeity describes a 
crucial aspect of intersubjectivity not because the latter is phylogenetically 
and ontogenetically grounded on a mere similarity between our body and 
the body of others, because the pictorial similarity, as we will see in a minute, 
is not the crucial point here. Intercorporeity describes a crucial aspect of 
intersubjectivity, because we and others all share the same intentional object 
– obviously to a certain degree - and our situated motor systems are similarly 
wired to accomplish similar goals. It is the sharing of the same situatedness 
and the sharing of the same intentional goals that makes intercorporeity a 
privileged access to the world of the other. 
What we learn from Cognitive Neuroscience is the following: the motor 
system of primates is primarily organized not in terms of movements, but 
rather in terms of goal-directed motor acts. Goal-directed motor acts are the 
nuclear building blocks around which action is produced, perceived and, to 
a certain degree, at least, understood. What makes of a movement a motor 
act? The presence of a goal. The same movement can accomplish different 
goals – a typical example I am always reiterating is that of flexing the finger 
of my hand. So, this is a movement. However, this movement can be put 
into service of completely different goals: scratch my hand, grab this mike, 
say hello: the movement is the same, the purposes are different. For many 
years we thought that the defining feature of the motor system is to enable 
the execution of movements; in order to attain to the teleological level we 
should put into action other parts of our brain. Most likely, the most anterior 
you go, the more cognitive you get, people claim, so, probably the pole of the 
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frontal lobe is where goals are living and where goals are communicated to 
the motor system whose main task is to set different muscles into action, thus 
enabling movement. I believe this characterization of the motor system is 
wrong or, at best, captures only one aspect of the functionality of the motor 
system. Why do I say that?
Because now we have the empirical evidence enabling us to justify the 
statement I’ve just made, namely that the motor system is best understood as 
enabling the accomplishment of motor goals. Neurons recorded in the ventral 
pre-motor cortex area F5 by Giacomo Rizzolatti and co-workers in the late 
eighties of last century (Rizzolatti et al. 1988), have the distinctive feature of 
being driven by goal-related motor acts like grasping a piece of food, with 
the mouth, with the right hand, or with the left hand. Different movements, 
different effectors. Nevertheless, these different movements lead all the same 
to the activation of the very same neuron. The great discovery of Giacomo 
Rizzolatti was to interpret such a firing as the outcome of goal coding: so 
these neurons do not code movement, they code the goal of taking possession 
of an object, no matter if with the mouth, right or left hand. We can resist, 
and indeed many people resist this hypothesis, many people still resist this 
interpretation, even after the data I am going to present. 
You can reason in the following way: why do you need to invoke mentalistic 
notions like that of télos, of goal? These neurons could be easily interpreted 
in a much more parsimonious way by making the statement: what these 
neurons are doing is sending divergent inputs to motor neurons sitting in the 
primary motor cortex which in turn control the closure of different effectors, 
the mouth, the right hand or the left hand. So we wouldn’t need to invoke 
the notion of a goal to make sense of these neurons. How can we falsify this 
parsimonious interpretation? By dissociating the movements from the goal, 
and this is exactly what we did. 
In this experiment (Umiltà et al. 2008) we have a dissociation: in order to 
accomplish the goal of grasping something, the monkey is no longer required 
to close the finger, but to open them while using a reverse type of pliers. 
The same neuron that fires when the monkey grasps with the bare hand or 
with normal pliers, in which goal accomplishment always coincides with 
finger flexion, also fires when the goal is accomplished by performing exactly 
the opposite type of movement, namely extending the fingers instead of 
flexing them. These neurons implement a goal state motor representation 
whose content is both intentional and motor in nature. Why intentional? 
Because it is a goal-centered motor representation that although referring 
to movement, cannot, as we have seen, be reduced to a single sequence of 
movements. But it’s also motor because the goal is mapped in motor terms. 
In other words, as the end point of a motor act, and although this motor 
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representation can differ with respect to single movements, nonetheless 
it must have a coherent motor content enabling it to determine a given 
behaviour and to control its execution, because we are in the motor system. 
Mirror neurons add to this property of goal relatedness the multimodal 
property of being active not only when the goal is accomplished by the owner 
of the mirror neuron, but also when a similar motor goal is accomplished by 
someone else.
So, the neuron fires both when the monkey grasp, but also when the monkey 
is witnessing the grasping being made in front of it by another individual, 
being a human being or a monkey. There is the coding of a similarity which 
is not a similarity of shape – curiously Edith Stein uses specifically the 
example of the hand – so a child hand, a monkey hand, a human adult hand is 
always a hand. What makes of this physical entity a hand? Well, among other 
things, the possibility, the intrinsic possibility of being instrumental to the 
accomplishment of a motor goal. 
Here I want briefly to condense some novel findings on mirror neurons: 
the first is that the motor goal-relatedness of grasping motor neurons also 
applies to mirror neurons. As demonstrated by the recent study of Rochat 
(Rochat et al. 2010), the same mirror neurons that fire when the monkey 
grasps by hand, or with reverse pliers, also fire when observing a grasp being 
made by a hand or by means of reverse pliers. It’s symmetric. The peak of the 
discharge is reached by mirror neurons at the accomplishment of the goal. 
However, if you confront the level of activation when the action is executed 
by the monkey, with respect to when the monkey is observing the action 
being performed by the other – although the pattern of discharge is identical, 
the intensity of the discharge in the latter case is significantly lower. This is 
crucial – I will come back to this point – because we have a neural mechanism 
that is mapping the same goal, no matter who is accomplishing it. However, 
mirror neurons react differently when the action is actively executed with 
respect to when it is only observed. 
But there is more. The monkey, in order to perform this task, needs to be 
trained. So we trained these monkeys for five months, in order to teach 
them how to control these crazy instruments. However, we investigated 
the discharge of mirror neurons also during the observation of objects 
being “grasped” by means of sticking them, a motor strategy monkeys 
never learned to execute. If you compare the temporal development of the 
discharge of mirror neurons during action observation, you see that the 
discharge occurs much earlier on to the extent that the observed action 
belongs to the motor repertoire of the monkey. The more the observed 
action belongs to the motor repertoire of the observer, the earliest occurs 
the response of the mirror neuron. This finding suggests two things: 1) motor 
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expertise plays a role in modulating the response of the mirror mechanism; 
2) the mirror mechanism has the potentiality to generalize, to map the very 
same goal also in observed behaviours that monkeys are not capable of 
performing.
Similar results were recently obtained in humans by Cattaneo and colleagues 
(Cattaneo et al. 2010) with transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). By means 
of TMS one can stimulate in a somatotopic way the motor system. According 
to where one places the stimulating coil, a very strong magnetic field excites 
a relatively limited population of neurons sitting below the location where 
the stimulator is placed. So, if you put the stimulator in correspondence with 
the region of the primary motor cortex that controls the movement of distal 
muscles, you can evoke a twitch in the muscles being controlled by the spinal 
neuron which in turn is controlled by the cortico-spinal neuron that you are 
stimulating. So, you are activating the piramidal tract and you lead to the 
activation of a muscle. Here, this kind of experiment, wants to learn how 
much the excitability of the motor system is influenced by viewing someone 
else doing something. In this particular case, people while being subjected to 
the stimulation were looking at an actor either playing with reverse pliers, 
similar to that employed by the monkey, or accomplishing a goal, taking 
possession of an object. To make a long story short, the motor facilitation has 
a completely different profile, according to the stimulus that was observed 
during the stimulation. If you stimulate the motor cortex while participants 
are watching a movement, opening and closing the gripper, you see a 
facilitation which is congruent with the movement: you facilitate the flexor 
muscles during the opening phase and you facilitate the extensor muscles 
during the closing phase. In this case motor facilitation is synchronous 
with the observed movement. However, if you are observing gripper being 
operated to accomplish a goal, e.g. to grasp a peanut, the facilitatory effect 
coincides with the accomplishment of the goal. The observation of a tool 
movement activates the cortical motor representation of the hand movements 
involved in the observed motor behaviour, but the observation of the tool 
goal-related motor act, activates a cortical representation of the observed 
motor goal, irrespective of the individual movements and the order required 
to accomplish the very same goal. In conclusion, we see in the human motor 
system the very same effect that we were able – with a much higher level of 
granularity – to measure in the macaque monkey brain. 
Next is another recent experiment (Caggiano et al. 2009) that was done in 
joint collaboration between the University of Tubingen and the Università 
degli Studi di Parma. This study demonstrates that the firing of mirror 
neurons is modulated by the proxemic relationship between actor and 
observer. You already know what peripersonal space is, it’s a motor space, the 
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space I can reach by outstretching my arm. When we first described mirror 
neurons, we didn’t systematically test if peripersonal modulation could be 
uncovered, which is specifically what is at stake here. In this study the action 
observed by the monkey is executed by the agent either within or outside the 
peripersonal space of the monkey. These authors discovered that while 50% 
of mirror neurons are not modulated by the distance at which the observed 
action occurs, the remaining 50% is modulated by this manipulation. So there 
are mirror neurons that are driven by the observation of the grasping only if 
it occurs in the extrapersonal space of the monkey, and others showing the 
opposite modulation. Some neurons are even more interesting, because they 
don’t fire if the experimenter grasps within the peripersonal space of the 
monkey. However, if the grasp is observed being performed at the very same 
spatial location but with the interposition of a transparent barrier which 
makes that object unreachable by the observing monkey, these neurons 
resume their activation. Although, geometrically speaking, the location is the 
same that before was totally uneffective in driving the cells, the potentiality 
for action is strongly modulated by this interposition of a transparent barrier 
and this manipulation of the potentiality for action of the observer modulates 
the discharge of the very same neuron. I think that this is very important and 
could lead to a new line of research on humans and there are people actively 
seeking to investigate this effect by means of virtual reality in humans.
To sum up: mirror neurons discharge when the action is executed or observed 
and when the consequences of the action can only be predicted. Even the noise 
produced by the action is sufficient to specifically trigger mirror neurons, 
so the neuron that fires when the monkey breaks the peanut also fires when 
the monkey sees someone else breaking the peanut but will also fire when 
the only sensory information the monkey receives is the noise of the peanut 
being broken by someone else. We believe that all these properties entitle us to 
interpret the mirror mechanism as a non-metarepresentational form of action 
understanding. Or better: this mechanism underpins, enables, makes it possible 
for us to directly understand the what, the motor goal, and – at least to a certain 
degree – also the why, the motor intention, of the observed behaviour of others. 
By motor intention I don’t imply the reasons causing a given behaviour. This is 
a grasp, ok? So mirror neurons, in my opinion enable us to understand directly 
that such biological motion is a grasp. Why do I grasp this? To drink, and we 
believe that this is still within the potentialities of this mechanism. Why do I 
drink? This is beyond, at least so far we have no empirical evidence enabling us 
to claim that the why of this motor intention is within the coding capabilities 
of the mirror mechanism. Because I am thirsty, because I am anxious and my 
salivation is reduced to zero and then I need to restore the hydric equilibrium 
within my mouth. I mean, this is beyond, but the what and the motor why, we 
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believe, are within the mirror mechanism capabilities, is something that this 
mechanism can buy you.
Let’s turn now to the mirror mechanism in humans. A meta-analysis of several 
brain imaging studies show that different regions within the premotor and 
posterior parietal cortices of the human brain are activated both during motor 
execution and action observation. Furthermore, there are other brain regions 
that show the same double pattern of activation. Not anymore in the domain of 
action, but in the domain of emotion or sensations. There are cortical sites that 
are activated during both the first-person experience and the observation of 
emotions or sensations. My model aims to provide a coherent framework and 
functional explanation of this variety of mirror mechanisms that nevertheless 
seem to share something: a functional mechanism that I characterize, 
unfortunately it turned out, as ‘embodied simulation’. 
What is embodied simulation in short? Is a crucial functional mechanism 
in social cognition, not confined to the domain of action, but encompassing 
other aspects of inter-subjectivity such as emotion and sensation. Why 
embodied? Because it uses a pre-existing body model in the brain. I mean: all 
of these brain areas showing mirror mechanisms, what they are doing? They 
model our interaction with the world. Well, this model of interaction, this 
praktognosia, turns out to be highly relevant also when the task is not to guide 
our own behaviour, but to interpret, to decode, to understand, the behaviour 
of others. 
Why simulation? Because we have an isomorphic representational format – 
indeed we map the actions of others onto our own motor representation as 
well as other emotions and sensations onto our visuomotor and sensorimotor 
representation. My disgust: I activate my insula. Your disgust: I still activate 
my insula. The term “representation” of course is employed in a very 
different way from its standard meaning. I refer, when I speak of motor 
representation, to a type of content which is generated by our interactions 
with the world, that is pre-theoretical and pre-linguistic, but that nonetheless 
has attributes or some attributes normally referred to conceptual content 
(Gallese 2001, 2003). 
The very last part of my talk is devoted to reply to some arguments against 
embodied simulation. Not those coming from the field of Classic Cognitive 
Neuroscience, but, unfortunately, from phenomenologists. Life is never 
easy. Okay, here at the end I quote Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher. “The 
sub-personal simulation process”, – they refer here to Alvin Goldman – “like 
its explicit cousin”, embodied simulation, “involves a multi-step process. 
First, we perceive a certain behaviour; this is followed immediately by 
activation of shared representations – in neutral mode; and this is followed 
by a determination of agency” (Gallagher-Zahavi 2008, p. 178). My reply: 
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such steps are unwarranted both at the phenomenal level – and we all agree 
on that – but also at the sub-personal level. I dispute that a given behaviour, 
like my grasping the microphone, can be directly perceived as such unless 
by evoking the activation of its motor content. What makes of the physical 
displacement of this physical entity which you call “my hand” contacting this 
other physical entity, the microphone, a grasping hand, is motor simulation. 
You must activate the motor system in order to have a direct appreciation 
of this biological motion as a grasping hand. But since the activation of 
such motor content occurs in the brain of the observer without any explicit 
movement, such activation in my opinion qualifies as motor simulation.
But apparently there are more simulation troubles. Simulation trouble (2007) 
is the title of one paper from Gallagher, but the same argument I think is 
employed in the joint co-authored book we are discussing today. According 
to Gallagher and Zahavi the phenomena that occur during the activation 
of mirror neurons should not be understood as a simulation for multiple 
reasons. These reasons include the “as if” quality of mirror mechanism, 
reportedly at odds with the fact that mirror neurons map intentional 
relations in a fashion that is neutral about the identity of the agentive/
subjective parameter.
My reply: it is certainly true that mirror neurons fire no matter whether the 
action is executed or perceived. However, it is also true that the intensity 
of their response is not the same in these two different situations. More 
generally, embodied simulation doesn’t imply that we experience others the 
way we experience ourselves. The I-Thou identity relation constitutes only 
one side of the inter-subjectivity coin. The cortical circuits at work when 
we act, neither completely overlap nor show the same activation intensity 
as when others are the agents and we are the witnesses of their action. The 
same logic applies to sensations and emotions. There is a very recent paper by 
Christian Keysers and co-workers (Jabbi et al. 2008), whose main target is the 
appreciation of disgust in others. So, again, like in our original experiment, 
voluntary participants in the fMRI are either being subjectively disgusted – 
this time by tasting some disgusting liquid – or view the expression of disgust 
of someone else or – third condition – read a narrative about somebody else’s 
disgust. The results of the experiment are the following: no matter whose 
disgust is at stake, the anterior insula always activates. At the very same 
location that we discovered in our original disgust experiment (Wicker et al. 
2003). However, this is only one part of the story. Together with this common, 
shared activation focus, there are other brain regions which uniquely activate 
during my disgust but not during your disgust or the disgust of a fictitious 
character in the narrative, and the other way around. 
Second, I don’t share Gallagher and Zahavi’s view that embodied simulation 
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– this is a more philosophical argument – must necessarily be characterized 
as simulation exclusively based upon the resemblance between target 
and simulator. As argued by the late Susan Hurley simulation can be more 
plausibly characterized in terms of reuse (Hurley 2005). According to the 
reuse notion of simulation, which I advocate, what distinguishes embodied 
simulation from theorizing is the reuse of a process for generating knowledge 
about that process. Neuroscientific evidence shows that motor neurons 
reuse motor processes enabling direct understanding of the actions of others 
and, similarly, viscero-motor or somatosensory neurons reuse emotion- and 
somatosensory-related processes enabling direct understanding of others’ 
emotions and sensations.
What qualifies simulation as embodied is specifically this notion of reuse 
describable as an isomorphic type of mapping between target and simulator. 
What makes the activation of mirror neurons or mirroring mechanisms in 
the human brain during the observation of the actions of other an “as if” 
process, is not its resemblance aspect. This cannot be the case because we 
have seen at the level of the single neuron that there is nothing resembling 
the movement of the hand operating with the reverse pliers with the way 
macaque monkeys’ hand appears when accomplishing the same goal. What 
makes the activation of mirror neurons during the observation of the actions 
of others an “as if” process is not the resemblance aspect, but the fact that 
in spite of an activation of the motor system in the observer’s brain, the 
action is not executed. Thus, I cannot find a better word than qualifying it as 
a “motor simulation”. This is the reason why I disagree with the claim that 
in order to invoke simulation mirror neurons “must generate an extra copy 
of the actions as they would be if they were the perceiver’s own actions” 
(Gallagher 2001, p. 102). Mirror neurons’ activation is the activation of the 
motor representation of that action, so there is no extra step to be invoked in 
order to explain it.
That said, I think that our perspectives share a lot more than what transpires 
from Gallagher and Zahavi’s critique of embodied simulation. We all think 
that mind reading should not be identified with the mostly theoretical 
enterprise usually defined as Theory of Mind. We all think that the primary 
way of understanding others is direct in nature.
However, I do believe, pace Gallagher and Zahavi, that such directedness is 
completely compatible with the reuse notion of simulation I am advocating. 
Claiming that the understanding of others is mediated by mirror-based 
embodied simulation is not tantamount to saying that a sort of pretence 
mediates the perception of others’ behaviour. All of these considerations 
make it difficult to account for mirroring phenomena as form of “direct 
perception”. Social cognition is not only explicitly thinking about the 
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contents’ of someone else’s mind. Our brain has developed a basic functional 
mechanism which I qualify as embodied simulation which gives us an 
experiential insight of other minds. The specific nature of such experiential 
insight is still very loosely defined, and there is a lot of very meticulous 
philosophical work in parallel with neuroscientific work to much better 
specify what we qualify as “experiential”. The shared “we-centric” space 
mapped by mirror neuron mechanisms generates the implicit certainties – 
which I think somehow overlaps with the notion of background as spelled out 
by John Searle – we entertain about others. 
Before and below mind reading is intercorporeity as the main source 
of knowledge we directly gather about others (Gallese 2007). Embodied 
simulation is one crucial ingredient of intercorporeity. The social cognitive 
endowements of our species could be the evolutionary outcome, the exaptation 
of mechanisms that are not mind reading specific. The I-Thou relation 
provides the basic ground for our cognitive/affective development, hence 
for our intimate being social individuals capable of mutual recognition and 
understanding. I would like to end with a quote from a book that should 
perhaps be retranslated in Italian, Ich und Du by Martin Buber (1923): “In the 
beginning is relation”. By empirically investigating the ontogeny of action you 
don’t know how true this statement is. But this is a different story. Thank you.
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